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Abstract: This study considers the impact of federal funding on the administrative expenditures of 
local school districts since the passage of the No-Child-Left-Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001. Under 
NCLB, federal education funds were made contingent upon a variety of accountability and reporting 
standards, creating new administrative costs and challenges for local school districts. According to 
the premises of resource dependence theory, these increases in administrative costs will likely be 
most pronounced among those local districts with the greatest reliance on federal revenue. Repeated 
measures models are constructed for a multi-state sample of public school districts to test the extent 
to which these policy changes may be influencing administrative expenditures at the local level. 
While effect sizes are small, the results do demonstrate a significant resource dependence effect, 
suggesting that districts with greater reliance on federal revenue are experiencing larger increases in 
administrative expenditures over time. 
Keywords: No child left behind; resource dependence theory; fiscal federalism; education 
policy. 
El Acta No Child Left Behind y Costos Administrativos: Un Estudio de la Dependencia de 
Recursos de los Distritos Escolares  
Resumen: Este estudio analiza el impacto de los fondos federales en los gastos administrativos de 
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los distritos escolares desde la aprobación de la legislación NCLB de 2001. En virtud de la ley 
NCLB, los fondos federales para la educación ponían como condición una variedad de medidas de 
responsabilidad educativa y presentación de informes, que generaron nuevos costos administrativos 
y desafíos para los distritos escolares. De acuerdo con las premisas de la teoría de dependencia de 
recursos, estos aumentos en los costos administrativos probablemente serán más pronunciados entre 
los distritos con mayor dependencia de ingresos federales. Generamos modelos de medidas 
repetidas para una muestra multi-estatal de distritos escolares públicos para poner a prueba el grado 
en que estos cambios de políticas influirían en los gastos administrativos de los distritos. Mientras 
que los tamaños del efecto son pequeños, los resultados demuestran un efecto significativo en la 
dependencia de recursos, lo que sugiere que los distritos con mayor dependencia de ingresos 
federales están experimentando mayores incrementos en sus gastos administrativos. 
Palabras clave: NCLB; teoría de la dependencia de recursos; federalismo fiscal; política 
educativa. 
A Legislação No Child Left Behind e os Custos Administrativos: Um Estudo de Recursos 
Distritos Escolares Dependência 
Resumo: O presente estudo analisa o impacto dos recursos federais para as despesas administrativas 
dos distritos escolares, desde a adopção da legislação NCLB em 2001. De acordo com NCLB, o 
financiamento federal para a educação tinha como condição uma série de medidas responsabilização 
educacional e relatórios, gerando novos custos administrativos para os distritos escolares. De acordo 
com os pressupostos da teoria da dependência de recursos, estes aumentos de custos administrativos 
tendem a ser mais pronunciada entre os distritos com maior dependência das receitas federais. 
Geramos modelos de medidas repetido para uma amostra multi-estado de distritos escolares 
públicos para testar em que medida estas mudanças de políticas afetariam os custos administrativos 
dos distritos. Enquanto os efeitos de tamanhos são pequenos, os resultados mostram um efeito 
significativo na dependência de recursos, o que sugere que os distritos com maior dependência das 
receitas federais estão enfrentando maiores aumentos nas despesas administrativas. 
Palavras-chave: NCLB; teoria da dependência dos recursos; federalismo fiscal; política educacional. 
Introduction1 
Despite a tradition of local control, public school districts in the United States operate in an 
open systems context that is increasingly shaped by federal education policy. The federal 
government’s role in K-12 education has expanded substantially over the past half century (Birman 
& Porter, 2002), with federal education expenditures increasing by $60 billion since the initial 
passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965 (Guthrie, Springer, Rolle, 
& Houck, 2007). The reauthorization of ESEA in 2001 under the No Child Left Behind Act 
(NCLB) led to more direct federal involvement in public education than at any time prior. 
Specifically, NCLB conditioned the receipt of Title 1 funds on several standards-based and 
accountability reforms, creating a variety of new administrative challenges for local school districts 
(McDermott & Jensen, 2005). This shift was in line with current practices of American federalism, in 
which the federal government has increasingly relied on conditional spending arrangements to 
achieve policy objectives at the state and local level (McDermott & Jensen, 2005).   
1  The author would like to thank the following individuals from North Carolina State University for their 
generous contributions of feedback and mentoring throughout the development of this paper: Dr. Rajade 
Berry-James, Dr. Kevin Brady, Dr. Jerrell Coggburn, Dr. G. David Garson, and Dr. Branda Nowell. 
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This conditioning of federal education dollars under NCLB altered the policy environment for 
public school districts, thus raising significant questions about organizational behavior and 
administrative costs at the local level. This article specifically examines how the changes 
implemented under NCLB have influenced administrative expenditures among local school districts 
with varying levels of federal resource dependence. The aggregate increase in administrative costs 
associated with NCLB has been documented in previous studies (see Mathis, 2005 for discussion), 
but according to the premises of resource dependence theory these increases will likely be 
exacerbated among those districts with the greatest reliance on federal revenues. This article seeks to 
explain the relationship between resource dependencies and administrative costs over time, using a 
multi-state sample and a longitudinal research design. 
Examination of these issues is important for several reasons. First, while federal 
contributions remain small in comparison to state and local funding, they can be comparatively large 
for high poverty districts that are unable to generate sufficient revenue from their local tax-bases 
(Riddle & Osorio-O’Dea, 2002). This means that any adverse impacts arising from resource 
dependencies would be most pronounced among at-risk districts, which could jeopardize core 
instructional missions in these districts. Furthermore, from a policy perspective, this analysis speaks 
to the practice of fiscal federalism in education policy, specifically the extent to which conditional 
funding may be impacting the goal of improved equity in resources. Finally, from a theoretical 
perspective, this analysis provides a unique opportunity to assess resource dependence theory in the 
context of public school districts, thereby adding an important element to the body of literature on 
RDT in public organizations. 
The section below briefly situates the policy changes adopted under NCLB in the larger 
context of federal education policy and its historical development over the past half century. This is 
followed by a discussion of resource dependence theory and how it serves as a framework for 
examining the impact of these changes on the organizational behavior of public school districts.  
NCLB and the Education Policy Environment 
Though the governance and administration of K-12 education in the United States is 
traditionally situated at the local level (Grissom & Herrington, 2012), school districts are also 
embedded within a broader external environment which influences their organizational behavior and 
outcomes. These environmental influences range from micro level concerns, such as community and 
student-body characteristics, to macro level factors, such as state and federal regulations (DiPaola & 
Tschannen-Moran, 2005; Simon, 1999). Among the most significant constraints imposed by this 
environment are organizational dependencies on external sources of information, legitimacy, and 
resources. For many districts, these dependencies are increasingly shaped by federal education policy 
(Fusarelli, 2002; Grissom & Herrington, 2012).   
Traditionally, federal education policy has focused on addressing inequities in resource 
allocation by providing supplemental support to school districts with high populations of historically 
disadvantaged students (Hanushek, 1989). This goal was explicitly set forth in Title 1 of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, and through four and a half decades of 
federal education reforms, “Title 1 has remained the cornerstone of federal education policy” 
(Gordon, 2008, p. 302). However, over time the nature of Title 1 funding has evolved (McDonnell, 
2005). Initially, the law’s primary focus was assisting in the education of disadvantaged students, 
particularly in high-poverty districts, and the earliest conditions placed upon local school districts 
were primarily limited to matters of fiscal accountability (McDonnell, 2005). Over subsequent 
reauthorizations of Title 1, federal goals evolved, and by 1994 the Improving America’s Schools Act 
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(IASA) introduced the concepts of standards based reform and accountability into federal education 
policy. This shift reflected the emerging belief that schools should demonstrate accountability with 
regard to their use of federal funding. (See McDonnell, 2005, for a full discussion). 
While IASA was the first reauthorization of Title 1 to establish standards-based reforms, the 
Department of Education never aggressively administered the law (McDermott & Jensen, 2005). 
These reforms did not become systematically enforced at the federal level until the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001. NCLB also reauthorized Title 1, building on the reforms introduced 
under IASA. For the first time, the continuation of Title 1 funding was made contingent upon 
verifiable performance outcomes (Gordon, 2008), marking a significant expansion of the federal 
government’s influence in K-12 education (Goertz, 2005).   
This shift toward stricter contingent funding under NCLB was in line with current practices 
of American federalism, namely an increasing tendency on the part of federal legislators toward 
greater exertion of policy influence through conditional financial arrangements (McDermott & 
Jensen, 2005). Due in part to Supreme Court rulings against excessive congressional interpretations 
of the Commerce Clause, federal lawmakers have increasingly looked to the use of conditional 
grants as a means of achieving federal policy objectives in policy domains that exceed their 
constitutional grasp (Christensen & Wise, 2009; Wise, 2001). Because the receipt of these grants by 
state and local agencies is (at least theoretically) optional, Congress’ authority to attach conditions to 
the receipt of federal grant monies has been widely upheld by the Supreme Court (Christensen & 
Wise, 2009; Wise, 2001). Well-known examples of this practice include the conditioning of federal 
highway dollars on state level policy outcomes such as the adoption of a 55 mile per hour speed 
limit and a uniform legal drinking age (Richardson & Houston, 2009). In education policy, NCLB 
marked the first major use of contingent grants as a strictly enforced policy tool, leading to what 
some have seen as an encroachment on the part of the federal government into K-12 education 
(McDermott & Jensen, 2005). 
This policy shift raises important organizational questions for public school districts, as 
previous research has shown that contingent funding arrangements tend to significantly influence 
the organizational structure and behavior of local government and nonprofit organizations. 
According to Smith (2006), these arrangements can compel organizations to “… adopt new 
administrative procedures, add professionals, institute new financial management practices, and in 
some cases, modify physical structures”, all leading to an increase in administrative expenses (Smith, 
2006, p. 235). Specifically in the case of Title 1 funding, McDonnell (2005) notes that the 
implementation of NCLB has required school districts to change both their priorities and their 
organizational behavior. For example, recent research found that school administrators in this policy 
environment are compelled “… to design entirely new formal organizational structures in their 
schools that support tighter coupling between policy, administration, and instruction” (Spillane & 
Kenny, 2012, p. 551). These organizational responses are consistent with the basic premises of 
resource dependence theory, which argues that organizations manage their resource dependencies, at 
least in part, by responding to environmental requirements in order to secure needed resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). The theory, which is discussed further below, also suggests that these 
responses will be exacerbated in organizations with greater reliance on the resources in question. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory argues that organizations are neither self-contained nor self-
sufficient, making their relationships with the external environment of utmost importance to their 
effective operation. The theory, which was originally proposed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), draws 
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from an open systems (e.g., Katz & Kahn, 1978) perspective, which views organizations as 
embedded in broader environments where they interact with and are influenced by other 
organizations. RDT adds a level of specificity to the general open systems approach, suggesting that 
a particular form of external contingency, namely resource dependencies, is of unique importance. 
In other words, not only are organizations influenced by what happens in their external 
environments, but they are also often dependent on other actors and organizations within these 
environments for essential resources. To the extent that these dependencies are critical to an 
organization’s survival, managing them becomes a top organizational priority. Consequently, Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) tended to situate the primary challenges of management outside of the 
organization in the external environment. As a result, RDT is concerned with the ways in which 
organizations respond to and manage their resource dependencies, how those decisions shape 
organizational structure/behavior, and the subsequent power dynamics that emerge. 
Since its introduction, RDT “… has become one of the most influential theories in 
organizational science and strategic management” (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009, p. 1404). Most 
commonly, RDT has been applied to the analysis of private sector concerns, where it has helped to 
explain organizational behaviors such as mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, board strategies, 
and executive successions to name a few (Hillman et al., 2009). Though RDT has been applied to 
public and voluntary sector concerns with less frequency, it has by no means been absent. Several 
studies have, either directly or indirectly, applied a resource dependence perspective to government 
and nonprofit organizations, with several high quality papers coming out in recent years (e.g., 
Garrow, 2011; MacIndoe, 2013; Malatesta & Smith, 2011; Mosley, 2012). In general, these studies 
have found RDT to be useful for explaining the behavior of public organizations in specific 
contexts, but a consensus has not yet emerged to the same degree that it has in private sector 
research (see Hillman et al., 2009). 
While RDT has generally not been applied directly to the study of K-12 school districts, it 
has been used in some analyses of higher education, where it has proved to be a useful theoretical 
framework for examining educational institutions. In an early application of the theory to higher 
education, Tolbert (1985) used RDT in conjunction with institutional theory (e.g., DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) to study administrative structure in American universities. Her 
analysis found a significant resource dependence effect, whereby levels of dependence on various 
revenue sources helped (in part) to explain the prevailing administrative structures across 
institutions. Subsequently, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) showed how changes in resource 
dependencies led to corresponding changes in the organizational behavior of academic institutions, 
including changes in institutional expenditure patterns as well as in faculty efforts/behaviors. More 
specifically, their work showed how decreases in non-contingent government funding led American 
universities to seek “substitute revenues” (such as research grants), which caused these institutions 
to shift their labor orientation and administrative structures toward the maintenance of these new 
resources. According to Slaughter and Leslie (1997), one of the consequences of this shift has been 
an increased institutional focus on academic research, which has necessarily come at the expense of 
student instruction.   
More recently, Fowles (2014) applied RDT in a panel study of U.S. colleges and universities, 
and he found that universities with greater dependence on tuition revenues tended to spend more 
on educational activities. He argues that this is consistent with the predictions of RDT, and that 
these institutions are responding to the interests of those stakeholders upon which they are most 
heavily dependent. In each case, these applications of RDT to higher education have found resource 
dependencies to impact the organizational behavior of academic institutions due to the conditions 
and expectations attached to revenue sources by external actors. This suggests that the application of 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 23 No. 26 6 
RDT to K-12 institutions is appropriate, especially in the post-NCLB environment discussed above, 
where considerable conditions have been attached to the continuation of Title 1 funding. 
Of particular concern in the case of NCLB are two important elements of resource 
dependence theory: (1) the contingencies and/or conditions often associated with resource 
dependencies, and (2) the potential influence exerted by dominant actors in cases of asymmetrical 
dependence. On the first matter, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) note that external resource providers 
often attach conditions to the continuation of resource provision. Frequently these conditions come 
in the form of accountability and reporting standards, which have become a centerpiece of both 
fiscal federalism in general and federal education policy specifically over recent years. In the case of 
NCLB, these contingencies/conditions include requirements for reporting on student outcomes, 
teacher qualifications, and the scientific validity of curricula and teaching practices to name a few 
(McDermott & Jensen, 2005). 
On the second matter, and based on premises established in prior research (e.g., Emerson, 
1962; Jacobs, 1974), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) note several conditions which are likely to “affect 
the extent to which an organization will comply” with such external demands (p. 44). Chief among 
these conditions are the recipient’s degree of dependence on the resource in question, the viability of 
alternative sources, and the extent to which the resource provider is codependent on the recipient 
for additional outcomes. In the case of education policy, as in many local government contexts, 
these factors vary on a district-to-district basis. For example, while federal policymakers are 
dependent on local school districts to achieve their goal of educating at-risk students, districts vary 
in the degree to which they depend on federal funds to achieve these goals. Thus based on the 
premises of RDT, a local school district’s efforts toward compliance would be expected to increase 
proportionally with its degree of dependence on federal revenues. 
Prior to the establishment of these contingencies under NCLB, it appears that dependence 
upon federal revenue did not, in and of itself, necessitate higher administrative overhead costs for 
public school districts, at least relative to their more locally funded counterparts. For example, in an 
earlier application of structural contingency theory to school district expenditures in the state of 
Washington, Simon (1999) found both federal and state revenues to have a stabilizing effect, 
resulting in lower administrative expenditures per pupil in comparison to districts with less reliable 
sources of revenue. A later analysis of school district resource allocations conducted by Baker (2003) 
found mixed evidence suggesting that federal revenue did not lead to increases in administrative 
expenditure shares, though it was related to increased administrative staffing shares. In each of these 
studies, administrative costs were most significantly influenced by organizational factors such as size, 
and school-level factors such as student body characteristics (i.e., poverty and special needs).   
These previous studies have helped to broaden our understanding of the relationship 
between resource dependencies and administrative costs within local school districts. However, both 
of these analyses were conducted using data that predated the implementation of NCLB, and both 
were inherently cross-sectional in nature. Given the policy changes instituted under NCLB, new 
questions have arisen regarding the potential effects of federal revenue on the administrative costs of 
local school districts, particularly for districts that are heavily reliant on federal revenues. As 
suggested by RDT, due to a lack of viable alternatives (i.e. a weak or unreliable local tax base), 
heavily resource dependent school districts are likely to respond to new accountability demands even 
more aggressively in order to maintain their existing revenue flows. 
If school districts are now responding to federal education policy by altering their 
organizational behavior/resource allocations in order to secure and manage federal funding streams, 
and if this trend is pronounced among more heavily resource dependent districts, one result may be 
an increase in administrative expenses at the local level, especially for school districts serving large 
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populations of at risk pupils. This would be significant in the sense that it would mark a shift from 
previous trends (i.e., Baker, 2003; Simon, 1999) and challenge the wisdom of overly encumbering 
Title 1 funding with accountability and reporting requirements. The remainder of this article 
empirically tests these concerns to determine if federal policy has fundamentally influenced 
administrative costs within local school districts, and if so, to what extent. 
Research Design 
Data Sample 
This analysis uses longitudinal data provided by the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES). In total, ten years of data were drawn for a seven state sample of public school districts. 
These data range from the 2000-01 school year (prior to the passage of NCLB) through the 2009-10 
school year, which was the most recent year for which complete data were available at the time of 
this writing. Given the public policy focus of this research, only traditional public school districts 
were included in the sample. Nontraditional entities such as charter schools, private schools, and 
special needs schools (i.e. schools for the blind, deaf, etc.) were excluded from this analysis.2 After 
removing all observations for which complete data were not available, the final sample included a 
total of 1,790 public school districts.3   
The seven states included in this sample account for a number of important distinctions. 
The sample contains at least one state from each primary Census region, as well as a mix of state 
sizes and demographics. More importantly, the sample includes a mix of public school funding 
mechanisms, which represent an important distinction in state policy environments. The state 
funding mechanisms in Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington are classified as foundation programs, 
while Connecticut, Vermont, and Wisconsin use an alternative approach known as district power 
equalizing (DPE) systems. North Carolina, which is included as a control state, is the only state 
currently using a flat grant system at the state level, which generally leads to greater equality in spending 
across districts than is seen under the other systems. Because the primary focus of this analysis is on 
the relationship between resource dependencies and administrative costs over time, the specifics of 
these state funding mechanisms are not discussed in detail here. For a more thorough discussion of 
these distinctions, see Verstegen (2011). 
2 To the extent possible, schools on Military Bases and Native American Territories were also excluded from 
this analysis as outliers with regard to federal revenue. 
3 In cases of incomplete data, only those years or observations for which data were not available were 
removed from the sample.  For instance, observations for a school district may have been removed for one 
or more of the ten years due to incomplete data without removing the district entirely from the analysis.  This 
strategy is appropriate given the methodological techniques employed, which are not sensitive to unbalanced 
data (See Heck, Thomas, & Tabata, 2010 for discussion).   
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Table 1 










Connecticut 165 Northeast DPE 3,405,565 3,574,097 
North Carolina 115 South Flat Grant 8,049,313 9,535,483 
Pennsylvania 499 Northeast Foundation 12,281,054 12,702,379 
Tennessee 135 South Foundation 5,689,283 6,346,105 
Vermont 204 Northeast DPE 608,827 625,741 
Washington 254 West Foundation 5,894,121 6,724,540 
Wisconsin 418 Midwest DPE 5,363,675 5,686,986 
Note. † Source: United States Census Bureau 
‡ Source: Verstegen (2011), retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v19n21.2011 
Dependent Variables 
Based on previous conventions (Baker, 2003; Monk & Hussain, 2000), this study considers 
both the base and share effects of school district expenditures. Base Effects represent total expenditures 
per pupil for a given expenditure category, while Share Effects represent the percentage (or share) of 
Total Current Expenditures spent on each category. The inclusion of both base and share effects allows 
for an understanding of not only dollar changes in the administrative spending categories over time, 
but also changes in the proportion of current expenditures dedicated to these functions. In total, this 
analysis considers six dependent variables, including base effects for (1) Administrative Expenditures, 
(2) Support Service Expenditures, and (3) Instructional Expenditures, as well as share effects for the same 
three spending categories. Based on the NCES data definitions, Administrative Expenditures refer 
narrowly to those expenditures associated with the offices of the principal and superintendent, as 
well as to expenditures associated with the school board. Support Service Expenditures provide a 
broader measurement of administrative overhead; they include those traditional administrative 
expenditures as well as additional costs such as business expenses and data processing. In the case of 
base effects, each category is measured in hundreds of dollars per pupil. 
Independent Variables 
In order to measure the impact of resource dependencies on administrative expenditures, 
independent variables are included for both federal and state resource dependence. Given the focus 
of this paper, these are the variables of primary concern to this analysis. Federal Dependence is 
operationalized as the average annual percentage of total revenues derived from federal sources over 
the ten-year period ranging from the 2000-01 through 2009-10 school years. In like manner, State 
Dependence is measured as the average annual percentage of total revenues derived from state sources 
over the same period. These ten year averages are used in order to capture each district’s general 
level of dependence on these funding sources, while minimalizing the influence of abnormal 
fluctuations such as local bond sales, short range federal grants, etc. It should be noted that the 
bivariate correlation between federal and state dependence was statistically significant at the p ≤ 0.05 
level, but the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) was only 0.297, suggesting that the variables were 
not highly collinear.4 
4 To avoid perfect multi-collinearity, local revenues were excluded from this analysis.  This choice was based 
on the theoretical importance of federal and state revenue to this analysis. 




School District Resource Dependence by State (As a Percentage of Total Revenue) 
  Federal Dependence State Dependence 
States N x  S x  s 
Connecticut 165 3.29 2.27 32.91 16.91 
North Carolina 115 10.91 3.48 62.36 6.92 
Pennsylvania 499 4.86 2.86 40.95 16.25 
Tennessee 135 11.68 2.96 53.78 9.67 
Vermont 204 3.01 1.96 74.26 23.89 
Washington 254 9.55 4.51 65.54 6.23 
Wisconsin 418 5.11 2.10 48.09 15.94 
TOTALS 1790 5.97 3.91 50.60 19.71 
Note. Source: 10 year revenue source averages from 2000-01 through 2009-10 school years; taken from 
NCES ELSi system, available at http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/elsi/tableGenerator.aspx  
 
Additionally, several control variables are also included in this analysis in order to account 
for known drivers of administrative overhead in public school districts. These include measures of 
size as well as measures of student composition. Both total enrollment5 and the number of 
operational schools in the district are included to account for economies of scale in administration. 
In each case, the logarithmic transformation is utilized due to the likelihood of diminishing marginal 
returns (see Baker, 2003; Simon, 1999). The percentage of students eligible for the federal free and 
reduced lunch program6 is also included, as well as the percentage of students on individualized 
education plans (IEP), as student body characteristics are known to be major drivers of 
administrative costs (see Baker, 2003; Simon, 1999). On top of these important control variables, 
dummy variables are included for each state in the sample, with North Carolina excluded as the 
reference category. It should be noted that additional state level variables are not included in this 
analysis. Since the primary goal is to identify the relationship between resource dependencies and 
administrative costs over time, dummy variables are sufficient to capture any significant variation at 
the state level. These dummy variables will not identify any underlying factors driving this variation, 
so additional research might be necessary if significant variation is present at the state level. 
Statistical Models 
In total, six repeated measures, random effect7 models are constructed for this analysis; one 
for each dependent variable. This approach allows us to examine the relationship between resource 
                                                 
5 Districts reporting less than 100 total students were not included in this analysis. 
6 It should be noted that original diagnostics revealed a Pearson r correlation of 0.70 between the federal 
dependence and free/reduced lunch variables.  Given the nature of federal education funding, multi-collinearity 
between these two variables is not unexpected.  In order to gauge the impact of this multi-collinearity on the 
models, subsequent models were run excluding federal dependence.  The removal of this variable did not 
significantly alter the parameter estimates or statistical significance of the FRL variable in any of the models, 
so both variables were retained given their theoretical relevance. 
7 Note that both the time and group effects are treated as random in these models, despite the acknowledged 
potential for some unobserved heterogeneity among these data (i.e. unobserved correlation between the 
higher level group/district effects and the lower level time-varying predictors).  The decision to use this 
approach instead of the more common fixed effects approach was based on several factors:  (1) this analysis 
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dependencies and administrative costs over time, and it accounts for variation both within and 
across school districts. Each model uses the 2000-01 school year as a baseline and then examines 
how resource dependencies influence the rate of change in administrative costs annually over a 10-
year period (until 2009-10). This approach allows us to see what the relationship between these 
variables was prior to NCLB, as well as how it has progressed over time since the law’s passage 
(2001) and implementation (2003). These models were constructed using the IBM SPSS Mixed 
Models module. For a comprehensive discussion of this methodology, see Heck, Thomas, and 
Tabata (2010). 
The generic form for these models is depicted below, where Formula 1 represents the model 
at level one (repeated measures), and Formulas 2 and 3 represent the model at level two (school 
district level). In each of the models, time is treated as a level one repeated measure, where π1i(time)ti  
describes the sample of school districts’ average rate of change in a dependent variable per unit of 
time (Formula 1), and π2i (time)
2
ti represents the quadratic transformation of the time variable, which 
depicts changes in the rate of change, such as an acceleration or deceleration in the trend (Heck et 
al., 2010). The time variable is simply a re-coding of year on a scale of zero through nine, with the 
earliest year (2000-01) coded as zero so that the intercept (π0i) is interpreted as a district’s initial level 
of the dependent variable at the start of the time-series. The four control variables discussed above 
are entered as level one, time-varying covariates. In other words, the values for these variables 
change on an annual basis. Their parameter estimates can therefore be interpreted as modifying the 
change in administrative expenditures at each subsequent interval. In each case, these variables (as 
well as the resource dependence variables) were centered for ease and relevance of interpretation. 
 
(1) Yt,i = π0i + π1i(time)ti + π2i (time)
2
ti +  π3i(enrollment)ti + π4i (schools)ti + π5ti (SES)ti + 
π6i (IEP Students)ti + εti 
 
At level two, the model includes randomly varying intercept and slope parameters (r0i and r1i), 
as well as the state dummy variables. Most importantly, the measures of federal and state resource 
dependence are included as level two variables (Formula 2), which is necessary given their 
measurement as ten year averages. The parameter estimates for level two variables are only 
interpreted as influencing the initial intercept for each district. This means that cross-level 
interaction terms are also necessary in order to gauge the cumulative impact of these variables over 
time. As shown in Formula 3, these interactions are included between each of the level two variables 
and the time variable at level one. For the purposes of this analysis, the interaction between federal 
dependence and time (time*federal dependence) is of primary concern, as this will depict the impact of 
federal resource dependence on the rate of change in administrative expenditures over time since the 
implementation of NCLB. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
is interested in shedding light on the broader, ongoing relationship between resource dependencies and 
administrative costs.  This makes a random effects approach theoretically appropriate for inferential reasons.  
(2) Furthermore, fixed effect models have been found to be most appropriate and effective when there is 
significant within-group variation on the time-varying predictors.  When predictor variables have little 
variation over time, as is often the case with these data, the standard errors for fixed effect models tend to be 
large, leading to imprecise parameter estimates (Allison 2009).  (3) Finally, conducting fixed effect models 
where N= 1,790 school districts would substantially and unduly reduce statistical power, while simultaneously 
ignoring rich and important cross-sectional variation.  For a more complete discussion of these issues, see 
Allison (2009) and Clark and Linzer (2013). 
No Child Left Behind and Administrative Costs  11 
 
(2) π0i = β00 + β01(Federal Dependence)i + β02(State Dependence)i + β03(Connecticut)i + 
β04(Pennsylvania)I + β05(Tennessee)i + β06(Vermont)I + β07(Washington)i + β08(Wisconsin)i + 
r0i 
 
(3) π1i = β10 + β11(time*Federal Dependence)i + β12(time*State Dependence)I + 
β13(time*Connecticut)i + β14(time*Pennsylvania)I + β15(time*Tennessee)i + 
β16(time*Vermont)I + β17(time*Washington)i + β18(time*Wisconsin)I + r1i 
 
Results 
Table 3 reports the results of repeated measures models for each of the base expenditure 
variables. These models examine changes in per pupil expenditures by spending category over the 
10-year period under consideration. Because each variable has been mean-centered and North 
Carolina has been excluded as the reference category, the intercepts can be interpreted as a North 
Carolina school district’s base expenditures for the initial time-period (2000-01), assuming mean 
levels of each covariate. From there, the parameter estimates for each covariate and each state 
dummy variable modify the regression equations on a district-by-district basis. As mentioned above, 
the base expenditure variables are measured in hundreds of dollars per pupil. Because this analysis is 
chiefly concerned with the relationship between resource dependencies and administrative costs 
since the passage of NCLB, the primary focus of this discussion is on (1) the time variables, which 
explain the rate of change in each dependent variable over time, (2) the federal dependence and state 
dependence variables, which demonstrate the impact of resource dependencies on the initial intercepts, 
and (3) the combined interaction effects for these variables (i.e., time*federal dependence), which show 
how these resource dependencies have influenced the rate of change in each dependent variable 
over time. Results for the additional control variables are briefly discussed at the conclusion of this 
section. 
As Table 3 shows, the parameter estimate for time is positive and statistically significant in 
each of the base expenditure models. This suggests that per pupil expenditures in each category have 
increased on an average annual basis for the ten years in question, ceteris paribus. For instance, the 
estimate for support service expenditures increases 1.138 (or approximately $114) for each time 
interval. As an example, consider a North Carolina school district with average values for each 
covariate. The initial intercept for support service expenditures would be 64.74, with the growth rate 
identified as 64.74 + 1.138(time). These numbers simply suggest that per pupil expenditures have 
been increasing across each category over the ten years in question. More germane to this analysis is 
how these rates of change have been influenced by resource dependencies. 
Because they are treated as time-invariant, level two variables, the parameter estimates for 
federal dependence and state dependence should only be interpreted as influencing a school district’s initial 
intercept for each dependent variable. As shown in Table 3, federal dependence was not significantly 
related to either administrative expenditures or support service expenditures in the base models. In 
other words, there was no statistically significant relationship between federal resource dependence 
and administrative costs in the 2000-01 school year. This is consistent with the belief that 
dependence on federal revenue did not increase administrative expenditures pre NCLB, though it 
should be noted that both Simon (1999) and Baker (2003) actually found federal revenue to be 
negatively related to administrative costs in their studies. Federal dependence was positively related 
to instructional expenditures in the initial period (2000-01), which may be expected given the nature 
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and purpose of federal funding at that point. In contrast, state revenue was negatively related to base 
expenditures in the initial time period for each of the three spending categories.   
Of most importance to this study is the interaction term between federal dependence and 
time, which is positive and statistically significantly in each expenditure model. In short, this means 
that as federal resource dependence increases, a district’s rate of growth in each spending category 
also increases significantly above and beyond the average. As hypothesized in this study, while 
federal resource dependence was not significantly related to administrative costs pre-NCLB, it has 
been significantly related to local school districts’ growth in administrative expenditures since the 
passage of NCLB. This suggests a shift from previous trends, most likely due to the contingencies 
associated with NCLB. This increase was largest in the case of support service expenditures, where β 
= 0.023. It should be noted that the effect sizes associated with these relationships tend to be small, 
though it should also be pointed out that the parameter estimates for these interaction terms have an 
ongoing effect for each subsequent time interval. Furthermore, while the data demonstrate a 
directional shift in the relationship between federal resource dependence and administrative 
expenditures post-NCLB, the offsetting increase in instructional expenditures, may suggest that this 
change has not necessarily “disadvantaged” these local districts from an instructional perspective, at 
least up to this point. 
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Table 3 
Base Expenditure Models (in $100's per pupil) 
 Variables† Administration Support Services Instruction 
    
District Level Variables 
   
     Intercept 22.726** 64.742** 99.530** 
     Enrollment (log) -2.253** -6.320** -8.333** 
     Operational Schools (log) 1.476** 4.992** 6.477** 
     Free Lunch Eligible (%) 0.004* 0.012** 0.011** 
     Individualized Education Plan (%) 0.010** 0.063** 0.116** 
     Federal Dependence 0.002 0.039 0.274** 
     State Dependence -0.031** -0.131** -0.211** 
States 
   
     Connecticut -1.167** 2.421** 5.493** 
     Pennsylvania -2.242** 0.191 0.116 
     Tennessee -3.436** -9.788** -9.040** 
     Vermont -2.686** -0.775 4.360** 
     Washington -2.077** -0.501 -3.686** 
     Wisconsin -2.011** 1.216* -0.214 
Trend & Interactions 
   
     Time 0.200** 1.138** 1.405** 
     Federal Dependence*Time 0.004** 0.023** 0.022** 
     State Dependence * Time -0.002** -0.008** -0.010** 
     Connecticut*Time 0.534** 1.744** 2.735** 
     Pennsylvania*Time 0.176** 0.621** 1.002** 
     Tennessee*Time 0.101** 0.119 -0.184 
     Vermont*Time 0.484** 1.446** 2.422** 
     Washington*Time 0.165** 0.410** 0.596** 
     Wisconsin*Time 0.218** 0.314** 0.501** 
     Time (Quadratic) -0.010** -0.019** 0.019** 
-2LL 40915.210 75166.767 84613.031 
Null -2LL 60590.043 103124.171 116158.486 
Note. † Random effects estimates not shown.  All random effects were significant at the p ≤ .001 level. 
*p≤.10; **p≤.05 
 
Contrary to federal dependence, parameter estimates for the interaction between state 
dependence and time are negatively related to base expenditures in each case, which means that the 
rate of growth in expenditures was generally smaller for school districts with more reliance on state 
funding. This suggests that the relationship between state revenue and administrative expenditures 
has not changed in response to NCLB, while the relationship between federal revenue and 
expenditures indeed does appear to have changed. It is also important to note that the quadratic 
transformation of time is negatively related to base expenditures in each administrative category 
(administration and support services). This suggests that the acceleration of growth in these 
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categories has slowed over more recent years (Heck et al., 2010). This could imply that 
administrative costs accelerated most quickly in the immediate response of local school districts to 
the requirements of NCLB, and that this trend is now abating as local school districts become more 
accustomed to and adept at managing these external resource contingencies. However, the data still 
suggest that administrative growth is higher among local school districts with greater reliance on 
federal revenue. 
Table 4 provides results for the expenditure share models, which examine changes in the 
share of total current expenditures devoted to each spending category. As the data demonstrate, the 
average growth rate (time) was negative and statistically significant for both administration and 
instruction as a percentage of total current expenditures, but was positive and significant for support 
service expenditures. This suggests that the percentage of total current expenditures dedicated to 
support services increased over the ten years, while the percentage dedicated to instruction and 
traditional administration decreased, ceteris paribus. It should be noted that that this does not 
necessarily imply a reduction in per pupil administrative or instructional expenditures, as shown in 
the base expenditure models (Table 3). This trend is intriguing, as it suggests that aggregate increases 
in administrative overhead arising from NCLB are largely occurring in functions associated with the 
broader support service expenditures category (i.e. business expenses and data processing), rather 
than in the traditional offices of the superintendent and principal. Future research might consider a 
disaggregation of the support service categories in order to better identify which specific 
administrative functions have been most significantly impacted by the requirements of NCLB. 
As in prior studies (Baker, 2003; Simon, 1999), federal resource dependence was negatively 
related to the share of expenditures dedicated to both administration (β = -0.035) and support 
services (β = -0.115) in the initial time period (prior to NCLB). Like the base effect models above, 
federal dependence was positively related to the initial intercept for instructional share. The 
interaction term for federal dependence and time shows that school districts with greater reliance on 
federal funds saw larger than average shifts toward support services over the ten years (β = 0.009), 
along with larger than average decreases in instructional share over the same time (β = -0.009). The 
coefficient for the administrative share model was not statistically significant, though state 
dependence had a negative impact on the growth of administrative share over time (β = -0.001). 
Once again, the effect sizes for these relationships are small, but as noted above, the parameter 
estimates associated with these interaction terms continue to accrue over time. Most importantly, 
these data do demonstrate a distinct resource dependence effect, where districts with greater reliance 
on federal revenue are experiencing a larger shift in the percentage of total current expenditures 
dedicated to support services over time. As was the case in the base spending models above, this 
differs from the pre-NCLB trend, as suggested by both previous studies (Baker, 2003; Simon, 1999) 
and the level two resource dependence variables.   
Collectively, these results demonstrate a weak to moderate resource dependence effect, 
whereby districts with greater reliance on federal revenue have seen larger increases in administrative 
overhead than those with less federal dependence in the post-NCLB era. The largest increase in 
administrative overhead seems to come in the broader support services category rather than the 
traditional administration category. These trends do not demonstrate a per pupil decrease in 
instructional spending among heavily resource dependent districts, but they do suggest a growing 
distinction in the allocation of expenditure shares among those districts as compared to their more 
locally or state funded counterparts. Furthermore, these findings show larger base dollar increases in 
administrative overhead among more heavily resource dependent districts, which may raise concerns 
over both efficiency and instructional focus in already at-risk districts. 
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Table 4 
Expenditure Share Models (as a % of Total Current Expenditures) 
Variables† Administration Support Services Instruction 
District Level Variables 
   
     Intercept 18.410** 40.053** 54.001** 
     Enrollment (log) -1.116** -1.214** 1.254** 
     Operational Schools (log) 0.444** 0.991** -0.945** 
     Free Lunch Eligible (%) 0.002 0.003 -0.009** 
     Individualized Education Plan (%) -0.007** -0.002 0.005 
     Federal Dependence -0.035** -0.115** 0.063** 
     State Dependence -0.003 -0.015** 0.005 
States    
     Connecticut -2.417** 0.562 1.267** 
     Pennsylvania -3.043** 0.705* 0.503 
     Tennessee -2.421** -4.651** 5.755** 
     Vermont -3.602** -1.223** 3.741** 
     Washington -2.344** 1.895** -1.456** 
     Wisconsin -2.668** 1.991** -0.280 
Trend & Interactions    
     Time -0.095** 0.277** -0.284** 
     Federal Dependence*Time 0.001 0.009** -0.009** 
     State Dependence * Time -0.001** -0.001 0.001 
     Connecticut*Time 0.197** 0.110** -0.128** 
     Pennsylvania*Time 0.152** 0.061 -0.088** 
     Tennessee*Time 0.169** 0.298** -0.385** 
     Vermont*Time 0.211** 0.131** -0.131** 
     Washington*Time 0.130** -0.028 0.026 
     Wisconsin*Time 0.202** -0.042 -0.019 
     Time (Quadratic) -0.010** -0.022** 0.026** 
-2LL 35288.015 59918.007 60789.309 
Null -2LL 41188.598 66068.120 66866.524 
Note. † Random effects estimates not shown.  All random effects were significant at the p ≤ .001 level. 
*p≤.10; **p≤.05 
 
For the most part, the additional control variables behaved largely as expected. Enrollment 
was negatively related to both base and share effects for the two administrative overhead categories, 
and was positively related to instructional share. The number of operational schools was positively 
related to administrative expenditures in both the base and share effect models, as was the 
percentage of IEP students. Perhaps surprisingly, socioeconomic status was not a major driver of 
expenditures in most models. As noted above, this was not due to multi-collinearity concerns, as the 
effect size and significance of the free and reduced lunch variable was not altered when federal dependence 
was removed from the models. Growth rates in base expenditures (Table 4) seemed to be highest 
among the Northeastern states, and Tennessee did not differ significantly from the reference 
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category (North Carolina) in two of the three base effect models. This may suggest a meaningful 
regional distinction in spending patterns, but this trend was less evident in the share effect models. 
Future studies might consider more specific drivers of state level variation, which was not a 
significant concern in this analysis. 
Discussion 
In 1999, two years prior to the passage of NCLB, Simon’s analysis concluded that 
dependence on federal revenue was not associated with larger administrative expenditures in public 
school districts. Since that time, the passage of NCLB has significantly altered the policy 
environment for public schools, making the continuation of Title 1 funding contingent upon new 
standards and accountability requirements. These changes have led to increased testing, tracking, and 
reporting requirements for school districts, among other administrative responsibilities (McDermott 
& Jensen, 2005). This study has considered the extent to which these changes in the federal policy 
environment have influenced the resource allocations of local school districts, particularly with 
regard to administrative costs. As predicted by resource dependence theory, school districts with 
heavy reliance on federal funding have experienced larger than average increases in administrative 
costs and administrative share over the last ten years, most likely in an effort to manage and 
maintain these revenue streams. 
From a theoretical perspective, these results contribute to the growing body of literature on 
resource dependence theory in public organizations, and more specifically, they provide some 
support for the application of RDT in local school districts. The findings demonstrate a significant 
relationship between resource dependence and administrative costs, even after controlling for the 
policy effect of NCLB and other known drivers of administrative overhead. Consistent with the 
aforementioned premises of RDT, these findings suggest that organizational responses to external 
conditions are proportional to the degree of dependence exhibited by the recipient organization 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This is consistent with the results of other recent studies, which have 
found resource dependency effects among the behavior of nonprofit service providers (Garrow, 
2011; Mosley, 2012), the design of public contracts (Malatesta & Smith, 2011), the social structure of 
policy networks (Park & Rethemeyer, 2012), and the expenditure patterns of colleges and 
universities (Fowles, 2014). The overall relevance of RDT to public school districts is certainly in 
need of further examination, but these findings suggest that further analysis should be a worthwhile 
pursuit. 
With that said, the interaction between RDT and institutional theory, which was explored in 
the aforementioned study of American universities conducted by Tolbert (1985), may help in part to 
explain the small effect sizes found in this study. Institutional theory (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977) attempts to explain how and why organizations adapt both structurally and 
behaviorally to the prevailing norms and expectations within their broader institutional 
environments. While RDT argues that organizations adapt in an effort to manage external resource 
dependencies, institutional theory suggests that many adaptations are made in an effort to maintain 
“legitimacy”, regardless of an institution’s level of physical/capital resource dependence. According 
to Tolbert (1985), when organizational behaviors become “institutionalized” as prevailing norms, 
responses based on varying levels of resource dependence will be attenuated, as all organizations will 
adopt similar practices in response to “isomorphic” pressures.   
This is certainly relevant to the case of NCLB, as all participating school districts face some 
level of accountability and reporting requirements, regardless of their varying levels of resource 
dependence. To the extent that the administrative practices adopted in response to these 
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requirements become institutionalized norms, all institutions will experience some level of increased 
costs, which will in part hide the overall effect. The resource dependence effect that remains in the 
additional variation is thus smaller than might be expected in the absence of strong isomorphic 
pressures. These factors do not nullify the relevance of RDT for analyses of K-12 school districts, 
but they do suggest that the theory might be most appropriate for explaining organizational 
behaviors in response to more “voluntary” policy arrangements. One potential opportunity for 
future research in this area may be the federal Race to the Top (RTT) program, which was passed as 
part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Because RTT is based largely on 
voluntary actions at the state level, more telling comparisons may be possible as further data become 
available. 
The small effect sizes found in this study may also be due in part to the nature of the 
expenditure categories used in the analysis. Because the instructional, administrative, and support service 
expenditure categories are broadly defined, containing a variety of different functions in each, it is 
possible that some important changes in organizational behavior are not being detected by these 
data. For example, recent research by Dee and Jacob (2010) found significant shifts in the allocation 
of instructional time post NCLB, with more instructional effort being shifted toward tested subjects 
such as math and reading, at the expense of untested subjects such as social studies and the 
humanities. While this change marks a significant shift in organizational behavior, it would not 
necessarily show up as a net change in instructional expenditures using the NCES data. If the 
resources in question (i.e. teacher salaries) were shuffled around but remained within the same 
expenditure category, then the impact of the policy change on organizational behavior would be 
missed. The same could be said of changes in administrative structure/behavior made in an effort to 
manage resource dependencies in response to NCLB. If any such changes did not involve the 
addition of new resources or the transfer of existing resources across these broad expenditure 
categories, then they would not show up as part of the resource dependence effect in these data. 
Regardless of the reasons behind these small effects sizes, the results of this analysis do help 
to improve our understanding of how resource dependencies impact local school districts in the 
post NCLB environment. Most notably, these results demonstrate a clear shift in the relationship 
between resource dependencies and administrative costs from that shown in pre-NCLB studies (i.e. 
Baker, 2003; Simon, 1999). In response to changes in federal policy, local school districts appear to 
have altered their organizational behavior, resulting in a significant change in internal resource 
allocations. Furthermore, while the effect sizes are small on a per interval basis, the ongoing impact 
of these changes over time can be significant, particularly if the observed trend continues into the 
future. For instance, if managing resource dependencies and maintaining revenue streams leads to a 
perpetuation of these trends, then over time the distribution of resources within school districts will 
become increasingly inequitable, even if the distribution of resources across school districts appears 
to be equalizing. It should be emphasized that this analysis is not sufficient to either demonstrate or 
predict a continuation of this trend far into the future; additional research will be required in order 
to answer that question. 
These research findings have implications for local school districts as well as for federal 
policy makers. At the local level, concerns emerge with regard to organizational dynamics and 
performance. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1974, 1978) have noted, given the importance of external 
resources to organizational survival, internal organizational power tends to accrue to those subunits 
that are most effective at procuring and maintaining resources. In the case of school districts, as 
administrative offices become of greater importance in the acquisition and maintenance of financial 
resources, one result may be a shift in organizational power toward these administrative offices or 
positions, potentially at the expense of instructional personnel. The nature of organizational decision 
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making could thus be shifted by these emerging power dynamics. There is at least limited evidence 
of this already, as research from the Center for Education Policy (2006) has suggested that reactions 
to the law have led to reductions in teacher autonomy over decisions such as curriculum adoption, 
pedagogical practices, and the scheduling of tests. 
These increases in administrative overhead raise not only potential organizational concerns 
for local school districts, but also potential instructional concerns as well. Several previous studies 
have suggested that such increases in bureaucracy at the district level can have a negative impact on 
student performance and educational outcomes. For instance, Anderson, Shughart, and Tollison 
(1991) found evidence of what they termed a “bureaucratic substitution effect”, whereby local 
school districts with larger administrative staffs (on a per pupil basis) tended to exhibit lower 
standardized test scores as well as lower graduation rates, ceteris paribus. Perhaps most famously, 
Chubb and Moe (1990) argued that excessive school bureaucracy could limit innovativeness and 
discretion among teachers, thereby impeding optimal educational performance, particularly in those 
schools where bureaucracies were most sizeable. More recently, Bohte (2001) found that higher 
levels of bureaucracy were associated with lower standardized test scores as well as lower SAT 
scores. It should be noted that there has been significant disagreement with these arguments (see 
Smith & Meier, 1994, 1995) and that in each of these studies, administration/bureaucracy was 
measured in terms of administrative staffing rather than administrative expenditures, which are used 
in this study. 
These results also raise concerns from a macro-policy perspective, particularly with regard to 
the use of contingent funding policies such as NCLB in public education. To the extent that these 
policy arrangements may create a disadvantage for resource dependent school districts (i.e. through 
increased administrative shares), then they could prove counterproductive to the original goals of 
federal education policy, namely reducing resource inequities and increasing educational outcomes 
for at-risk students. Because schools receiving the largest shares of federal revenue tend to be 
serving large populations of at-risk/low SES students, these policies could raise significant equity 
concerns if the resource dependence effect is cumulative over time. The resource dependence effect 
appears small enough in this case that it does not warrant significant policy adjustments on these 
grounds; however this effect could presumably be exacerbated by future policy reforms if additional 
contingencies are imposed on local school districts. Regardless of effect size, it appears that the 
weight of federal contingencies falls most heavily on those districts with the greatest need for federal 
aid. While this may make sense from an accountability perspective, it could ultimately prove 
detrimental to the central goal of federal education policy. 
This analysis serves as a “first-look” at these data post NCLB, and while it demonstrates a 
definite shift in trends over time, some limitations are evident in the research design. For instance, 
these models do not account for additional changes in education policy over the time-series under 
consideration. While Race to the Top, which was passed as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, was not a factor during this time, changes in other areas, such as the 
Improving Head Start for School Readiness Act (2007), may have influenced administrative 
behaviors/expenditures across this sample. Furthermore, changes in policy within the individual 
states, such as the expanded use of charter schools and other non-traditional alternatives to public 
schooling, may also have impacted administrative costs and behaviors in part or all of the sample. 
As mentioned above, the design is also limited by the nature of the expenditure categories 
under consideration, which are not able to account for significant shifts in resources or changes in 
organizational behavior within these broad categories. Additional research may be necessary to 
account for the impact of these limitations. Future work may also consider the extent to which the 
trends observed in this analysis are continuing beyond the 2009-10 school year or if they are 
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beginning to abate as NCLB nears ten years since its initial implementation. As time and data accrue, 
the impact of Race to the Top (2009) on administrative costs and behaviors should also be 
considered. While this seven state sample provides for a robust analysis, a three level model 
conducted on a national sample would also serve to alleviate any lingering concerns over external 
reliability. Collectively, these results provide some support for the hypothesis that resource 
dependencies have led to greater administrative costs in the wake of NCLB, but further research is 
required in order to better understand the extent of this relationship and its ramifications for both 
federal policy and local behavior. 
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